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Abstract. One of the fundamental challenges of governance is deciding
when and how to intervene in multi-agent systems in order to impact
group-wide metrics of success. This is particularly challenging when pro-
posed interventions are novel and expensive. For example, one may wish
to modify a building’s layout to improve the efficiency of its escape route.
Evaluating such interventions would generally require access to an elabo-
rate simulator, which must be constructed ad-hoc for each environment,
and can be prohibitively costly or inaccurate. Here we examine a sim-
ple alternative: Optimize By Observational Extrapolation (OBOE). The
idea is to use observed behavioural trajectories, without any interven-
tions, to learn predictive models mapping environment states to individ-
ual agent outcomes, and then use these to evaluate and select changes.
We evaluate OBOE in socially complex gridworld environments and con-
sider novel physical interventions that our models were not trained on.
We show that neural network models trained to predict agent returns
on baseline environments are effective at selecting among the interven-
tions. Thus, OBOE can provide guidance for challenging questions like:
“which wall should I tear down in order to minimize the Gini index of
this group?”
Keywords: Deep learning · Governance · Interventions · Social mod-
elling · Counterfactuals · Extrapolation
1 Introduction
A key interest in multi-agent research is to understand mechanisms that shift
group behaviour towards some desirable goals or outcomes such as using insti-
tutions, or central agents, that can modify the environment in real time.
For example, suppose there’s a traffic intersection that has inconvenienced
many road users with its lengthy wait times and poor visibility, and we’re ad-
vising a municipal government about whether to intervene, e.g. by installing a
roundabout. There can be several desiderata, e.g. we may wish to reduce acci-
dents and congestion.
One way to answer the question is to install the roundabout and measure
the metrics of interest. This is scientifically simplest but practically prohibitive.
Alternatively, one could simulate the change using a detailed traffic model. The
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model may need to make substantial assumptions that might be broken by unan-
ticipated circumstances, such as weather conditions, or unusual road users like
electric scooters, etc. Further, designing and adjusting the simulator is a signif-
icant up-front research cost. Instead, the strategy we propose is to exploit the
abundance of observational data (such as traffic patterns across a set of urban
environments) and avoid relying on expensive experimental data (in which the
intervention is tried, in either reality or simulation).
Our contribution is a method, which we call OBOE (Optimize By Obser-
vational Extrapolation), for building a central agent tasked with altering the
physical environment where a group of agents interact, in pursuit of a group-
level outcome. We construct this central agent by training a model to predict
forward outcomes for each agent (e.g. forward returns) from environment states
using purely observational data. Our central agent then uses these models to
evaluate candidate interventions in real-time by modifying a snapshot of the
environment, and selecting the intervention that produces the best result as
estimated by the predictive model, and in terms of the desired outcome metric.
We evaluate our method on two socially complex grid-world environments, a
variety of candidate interventions, and consider various model architectures. Our
results show that predictive models trained on observational data can identify
interventions that lead to desirable outcomes, and are thus well suited to build
the central agent we set out to design. In some cases, we find that the resulting
OBOE central agent is more effective than a simulation-based central agent that
selects an intervention using multiple perfect (but stochastic) simulations of the
environment.
2 Related work
Multi-agent reinforcement learning has received considerable attention in re-
cent years, both as a training paradigm to construct powerful individual agents
[2,35,3], and as a tool to study the role and emergence of human pro-social
inductive biases and institutions in complex environments [20,25,26,32]. In this
context, the idea of “opponent shaping”, that is, constructing agents that actively
influence the learning and behavior of others through conditional cooperation,
or assuming the role of a central mechanism, has emerged as a key challenge to
investigate [6,15,3,30,22,27]. Unlike past work in this area, we investigate how to
train such a central mechanism by generalizing entirely from observational data.
The recent advances of multi-agent reinforcement learning, and the challenges
posed by agents that interact with other non-stationary, adaptive learners has
sparked interest in “machine theory of mind” [33], as well as in the development of
sophisticated behavioral models of multi-agent systems, often based on relational
architectures [5,19,24,36]. We build on this work, adapting it for use as a central
agent to achieve social goals.
The idea of changing elements of multi-agent environments so as to shepherd
the behavior of groups towards outcomes that are desirable for the designer is
a well-studied problem in economics. In particular, the sub-field of mechanism
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design has focused on analyzing the effects of changing payoff structures and
reward signals, especially in the context of auction design [29,38,9]. Our work
addresses these questions implicitly in its behavioural model, without reference
to rationality assumptions – however it does not address how learning agents
might change their policies in response to the central agent, which is a limitation.
In recent years there has been work on learning to simulate physical systems
[34], make counterfactual physical predictions [4], and learn physical controllers
[17]. Our work builds on this line of thought, targeting the challenges posed by
a multiagent setting.
Finally, a number of researchers have investigated the effects of modifying
the physical environment so as to promote or dissuade certain group behavior,
especially in the context of pedestrian modeling and sheep herding [28,23,10,8].
We address this question in a broader context where the behavioural models
must be learned rather than hand-coded.
3 Method and experimental set-up
We introduce OBOE, a new method to construct a central agent that can opti-
mize social metrics by intervening in the physical environment. Importantly, we
assume that it is either hard or impossible to simulate the effects of these inter-
ventions, and therefore it is desirable to learn to estimate their efficacy based
solely on an observational dataset, i.e. from trajectories of agents interacting in
the environment, without any intervention whatsoever.
The OBOE method will proceed in 2 stages. In Section 3.1 we describe the
dataset; then in Section 3.2 we describe the construction of the central agent. Fol-
lowing those subsections we’ll describe the evaluation procedure. In Section 3.3
we describe how we generate a complete evaluation dataset of all possible in-
terventions, and in Section 3.4 we describe how we use this dataset to identify
which tasks are most suitable for evaluating the central agent.
Note that the training of the central agent in Sections 3.1–3.2 and its eval-
uation in Sections 3.3–3.4 are separate procedures. Evaluation requires coun-
terfactual data for all possible interventions, which are not generally available
in practice. For the purposes of this paper, we provide the counterfactual data
(from additional simulations) for estimating the maximum achievable effect by
a central agent. It’s possible to validate our central agent itself much more eco-
nomically, by only gathering data according to its prescribed interventions.
In our experiments we simplify the task for the central agent by only con-
sidering single interventions at a fixed timestep; this already pushes OBOE into
new territory and gives a good indication of its promise, while still making it
easy to generate a full evaluation dataset. The same central agents could also be
used to intervene at multiple timesteps per episode.
3.1 Collect observational dataset
We first need to select environments and collect a dataset of many episodes, with
no central agent nor interventions. Our environments and players are described
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in Section 4 and detailed further in Appendix B; in brief, we trained players with
multi-agent reinforcement learning [25] on some Markov social dilemma games.
3.2 Construct a central agent
We consider a central agent whose objective is to optimise an episode social met-
ric of interestM , which is computed per-episode as a function of individual agent’
outcomes aggregated across the episode. In our environments these outcomes are
the total returns across the episode: for agent i, we write this as Ri =
∑T
t=1 r
t
i ,
where rti is reward. We can then write the metric asM(R1, . . . , Rk). For example,
the collective return isM(R1, . . . , Rk) =
∑
iRi. We also need the representation
of environment states s to let us construct intervention functions s′a(s) for each
possible intervention a (e.g., build a wall) in the central agent’s action space.
We use the observational dataset from Section 3.1 to train a forward re-
turn predictor1 (or in general, forward aggregated outcome predictor) Rˆ>t(st; i)
(where the environment state st includes the timestep t, as well as the re-
turns R≤ti (st) so far for agent i). Now, we can combine this with the inter-
vention functions to estimate the central agent’s action-value function Q(s, a),
i.e. the metric value that would result from the intervention a, as Qˆ(st, a) =
1 This requires a model; we discuss model choices in Section 6.
Central agent 
model architecture
Observational Data
Physical 
Environment
Participants’ 
Policies Train Forward Return 
Predictor
Modify Env. State 
Representation 
according to
Construct Forward Return Predictor from Observational Data
Construct Central Agent’s Q-function using Forward Return Predictor
... ...
Use Forward Return Predictor 
to construct  
Use Forward Return Predictor 
to construct  
: move waste 
down
    : move waste 
to center
Fig. 1. An illustration of the OBOE method, with an example “move waste” interven-
tion on the Cleanup game.
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M(Rˆ>t(s′a(st); 1) +R
≤t
1 (st), . . . , Rˆ
>t(s′a(st); k) +R
≤t
k (st)). We propose a central
agent policy that selects actions greedily according to this Qˆ.
3.3 Collect evaluation dataset
In order to evaluate the central agent, we collect an evaluation dataset. We
record new trajectories of game play using, as before, our trained policies for
participant agents. Importantly, however, here we do modify the environment
state according to all possible interventions, and collect the various outcomes.
With this data, we can compare the intervention selected via Qˆ(s, a) to other
possible actions, and evaluate the central agent.
3.4 Task filtering
Finally, we use this second dataset to detect intervention families that result in
no effect on social outcomes, or which do not require access to the environment
states to be evaluated. We remove these tasks from our analysis since they would
not be informative. This procedure is outlined in detail in Section 5.
4 Tasks
In order to test the OBOE method, we need suitable tasks, where:
– The agents interact nontrivially, so it’s not obvious how an intervention will
affect social outcomes.
– The environment state is fully observed, as in a Markov game.
– The observed environment state is easily represented in a structured form,
so we can intervene on the structured representation and get predicted in-
tervention effects from the model.
– We can simulate the ground truth with the interventions (for evaluation).
We use two spatiotemporal social dilemma games which meet the above cri-
teria: Cleanup, and Harvest. [20,22,12,40,31] In particular, the social outcomes
are nontrivial to predict, both because the games pose social dilemmas to the
players, and because the players are trained via deep RL. These games allowed
us to construct several qualitatively different sorts of interventions, which was
another desired criterion. The way the players were trained is detailed in Ap-
pendix B. While these games and players were adequate for our purposes, they’re
not special; OBOE is equally applicable in settings quite unlike them.
Cleanup: Cleanup (Figure 2) is a public goods game in which 5 players collect
apples from a field (right side), which grow only if the players collectively keep
the waste accumulating in the aquifer (left side) at a low enough level, by cleaning
it up. The simple primary objective of players in Cleanup is to collect as many
apples as they can. However, the mechanics of the environment place players in
a socially complex world: if the waste level is low, it’s in each player’s individual
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(a) before (b) after
Fig. 2. A “move waste” inter-
vention for the Cleanup game.
(a) before (b) after
Fig. 3. An “add wall” intervention for the Har-
vest game.
interest to remain in the field collecting apples. This neglect causes waste to
accumulate, which negatively impacts the future apple spawn rate. This intricate
dependency poses a dilemma between free-riding (collecting apples) and looking
after the public good (cleaning the aquifer), which the players need to navigate.
Interventions: We consider three types of intervention for a central agent to
make partway through a Cleanup game, at time 325 (out of 1000): 1) moving
players (to one of 7 predefined locations2, 2) moving waste (falling up, down,
left, right, or towards the vertical center, among the aquifer map locations), and
3) moving apples (similarly to moving waste, but among the field locations). A
“move waste” intervention is illustrated in Figure 2.
Harvest: Harvest (Figure 3) is a common pool resource game. As in Cleanup, the
players collect apples from fields; but in Harvest, the apples only respawn if there
are other intact apples nearby. The fields are located in corner rooms of the map,
which is procedurally generated; and players can guard their rooms by firing a
punishment beam at each other. In Harvest, players face a dilemma between
their short- and long-term interests: if they don’t distribute their harvesting
across space or time, they deplete the apple stock, which may not recover; if
they move around too much, other players will collect most apples.
Interventions: We considered two types of intervention in Harvest: adding walls,
and removing walls, both at time 30 (out of 1000). Since the underlying map
is variable, we couldn’t use a fixed set of interventions lest we tear down a
nonexistent wall or build a wall atop a player, so we instead queried the central
agent on 15 valid, procedurally generated candidates. An “add wall” intervention
is illustrated in Figure 3.
More details about the games are provided in Appendix B.
4.1 Metrics
To construct tasks for the central agent, we combine each of these 5 classes of
intervention with 4 social outcomes, based on maximizing or minimizing. Two
2 (1, 1), (1, 23), (16, 1), (16, 23), (9, 1), (9, 9), and (9, 23) on the 18× 25 map.
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metrics are taken across each episode: the collective return, and the Gini index
[16] (an inequality measure).3 This gives a total of 20 intervention tasks for the
central agent. Table 1 shows the mean metric values among the observational
data; equivalently, these give the absolute performance of a “no-op” central agent.
Cleanup Harvest
Maps standard procedural (rooms)
Baseline mean
metrics
collective return 1570.2
Gini index 0.1966
collective return 584.6
Gini index 0.3139
Interventions at t = 325 of 1000:
– move players (each of the 5
players, to 7 fixed
locations2)
– move waste (up, down, left,
right, center)
– move apples (similarly)
at t = 30 of 1000:
– add walls (15 random
options provided)
– remove walls (15 random
options provided)
Table 1. A summary of the interventions on the 2 games.
5 Task analysis and filtering
In this section we outline a brief analysis of the 20 intervention tasks just de-
scribed. Our main goal here is to filter out tasks that do not probe the central
agent’s ability to consider and evaluate modifications to the physical environ-
ment in pursuit of an effect on some social outcome. In particular, we seek to
select out tasks that fail to meet two intuitive standards:
1. It should be possible, by modifying the physical environment in the ways
prescribed (e.g. by moving agents or adding walls), to affect the social out-
come of interest (e.g. to maximize the welfare of our agents). In other words,
we wish to prune out those tasks for which even an “ideal” central agent
cannot help the situation better than by selecting a random action.
2. We are only interested in tasks where the optimal action depends on the
environment state; for example, if we found that for a specific metric, no
matter the state of the game, it’s always best to move agents to the top left
corner, we would filter out this task.
Here we describe the selection process, and the details of how we constructed
three baseline central agents: an “ideal” one, a “random” one and a “constant ac-
tion” one. These are constructed using an evaluation dataset with game episodes
for both environments we consider (4 × 250 for Cleanup4, 5000 for Harvest), in
which every possible intervention was tried.
3 Because the Gini index is nonlinear, strictly speaking the method of Section 3.2
will produce a biased result even if the forward return predictors are unbiased. We
disregard this issue.
4 Corresponding to the different player populations; see Appendix B.1.
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The “random” central agent: We measured the average outcome of all possible
interventions in each scenario.
The “constant action” central agent: We measured the performance of each in-
tervention across all recorded episodes, and selected the intervention whose aver-
age was best5. We highlight that in Cleanup the interventions are defined across
episodes (e.g. “move waste up”), whereas in Harvest the only consistent constant
intervention is “do nothing”, because the “add wall” and “remove wall” locations
are procedurally generated.
The “ideal”, or “CV” central agent: As in OBOE, this central agent was con-
structed to select the candidate intervention based on its predicted effect on
social outcomes. However, instead of extrapolating using a model, we used the
true environment simulator : that is, we selected the best intervention according
to the actual environment trajectories we recorded. Since both games and par-
ticipants’ policies are stochastic, doing this naïvely results in a selection bias;
we eliminated this bias by using cross-validation. For every intervention we con-
sidered, we generated 5 different post-intervention completions of the episode
by altering a random seed that’s used for sampling from the players’ stochastic
policies. One of the 5 trajectories was used for evaluation, and the other 4 were
used to produce an unbiased estimate of the social outcome (by averaging).
The CV central agent provides an interesting benchmark. It reflects the per-
formance we’d expect if we had access to a perfect simulator of the interventions,
and a reasonable (if naïve) budget to run such simulations. This allows us to
select out tasks for which even an “ideal” agent cannot do better than random,
or better than a “constant action” agent, and to put other central agents’ per-
formance into context. In Table 2 we present the achieved effect for each task6
(relative to choosing no intervention) of selecting using the CV central agent,
versus these other baselines. To conduct the task filtering, the table indicates
for each task whether the CV central agent outperformed the baselines with
statistical significance (at level α = 0.05).
6 Models
As described in Section 3.2, we construct the central agent using models that
predict the forward returns of each player, given a time step observation of the
games. We use three architectures: two ubiquitous ones (a convolutional neural
network (CNN) and a multi-layer perceptron (MLP)), and a Relational Forward
Model (RFM) [36], chosen because it captures multi-agent interactions well and
its structured input representation makes it easy to construct interventions. De-
tails about model hyperparameters and training are provided in Appendix A.
The three architectures call for slightly different input representations.
5 This creates a small selection bias.
6 The “move apples” tasks in Cleanup were excluded because even the CV central
agent could not produce any significant effect.
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Cleanup6 move players (36 choices) move waste (6 choices)
collective Gini index collective Gini index
min max min max min max min max
Random −4.5 −4.5 0.0026 0.0026 6.8 6.8 0.0001 0.0001
Best constant −54.6 11.3 −0.0023 0.0295 −5.2 29.1 −0.0004 0.0015
CV −71.8 12.6 −0.0039 0.0481 −14.1 23.6 −0.0004 0.0005
Harvest add walls (16 choices) remove walls (16 choices)
collective Gini index collective Gini index
min max min max min max min max
Random −1.5 −1.5 0.0152 0.0152 12.9 12.9 −0.0007 −0.0007
Null 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CV −99.1 71.2 −0.0219 0.0993 3.1 37.8 −0.0093 0.0092
Table 2. Filtering intervention tasks. Each intervention task is determined by a game,
a class of interventions (which always includes the null intervention), a social metric,
and a direction to optimize the metric. For each task, we compare the mean effect of the
CV central agent with two baselines. Where we have statistically significant evidence
that CV outperforms both (at level α = 0.05), we highlight the CV result; where we
don’t, we highlight the baseline(s) it didn’t significantly outperform, with red for the
random baseline (suggesting the intervention may have no effect at all) and yellow for
the constant baseline (suggesting it may not be possible to do better than selecting the
same intervention every time).
– For the RFM, we use a graph representation whose nodes are the individ-
ual agents as well as the potentially active map locations (all locations for
Harvest, apple and waste locations for Cleanup). The node features are: x
and y position, a one-hot for the non-agent content of the map location (for
Cleanup: clean water, dirty water, empty field, apple; for Harvest: empty
field, apple, wall, empty space), the player’s identity (for Cleanup, i.e. proso-
cial or antisocial; see Appendix B.1), the last action and reward, and the
player orientation. The graph contains edges from every node to every agent
node, and no input edge features are provided. Further, there is a single
global feature: the timestep. All features are whitened to have mean zero
and standard deviation 1.
– For the MLP, we use an input representation that contains all of the nodes’
features, and the global feature, encoded as a concatenated vector.
– For the CNN, we provide separate channels for the agent node features, the
non-agent node features, the global feature (timestep), and a channel that
indicates which agent to predict forward return for.
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7 Results
In Section 7.1 we describe the outcome of the task filtering we laid out in Sec-
tion 5. In Section 7.2 we briefly compare the models in terms of their predictive
performance on the validation subset of the observational data. In Section 7.3
we’ll combine these tasks and models, establishing the resulting OBOE central
agents’ success on the filtered tasks.
It’s useful to note that while the task filtering is useful here (because we
don’t know a priori what to expect from these interventions), we are only using
the CV agent as a source of additional validation. The CV agent allows us
to measure performance relative to an estimated optimum, but measuring the
OBOE agents’ performance in absolute terms would only require data for their
selected interventions, rather than for all candidate interventions (as CV does).
7.1 Tasks
Before turning our attention to the trained models and resulting central agents,
we review Table 2, in which we probe tasks by comparing the CV central agent
with naïve baseline agents. On one of the tasks (5 including the “move apple”
interventions6), the CV agent doesn’t significantly beat a random baseline, so
it may not be possible to achieve the desired social outcome using the available
interventions. For an additional 4 tasks, there was a constant-intervention base-
line that the CV agent couldn’t significantly beat. This leaves 11 tasks (4 in
Cleanup, and 7 of the 8 in Harvest) where we have evidence that the task meets
the standards laid out in Section 5; we call these the significant tasks.
7.2 Models
MLP RFM CNN
Cleanup 775 757 748
Harvest 1485 1291 1205
Table 3. Best validation loss
for each architecture in Sec-
tion 6.
Following, we focus on the performance of the cen-
tral agent design we propose. We trained models as
described in Section 6, selecting the ones for each
architecture that achieve lowest validation MSE on
forward returns; the validation losses are displayed
in Table 3.
All models achieved comparable validation loss
on the no-intervention datasets. For each dataset,
the convolutional model achieved lowest loss, fol-
lowed by the relational model.
7.3 Central agents
Finally, we evaluate the OBOE central agents constructed using these models,
on each of the significant tasks. In order to normalize the performance across
the tasks, we compute a normalized score as:
effectiveness =
M¯CA − M¯random
M¯CV − M¯random ,
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Mean intervention effect
Intervention Class OBOE
Game Type Task Random CV MLP RFM CNN
Cleanup move players min collective return −4.5 −71.8 −60.6 −96.7 −95.0
min Gini index 0.0026 −0.0039 −0.0002 −0.0034 −0.0050
max Gini index 0.0026 0.0481 0.0198 0.0464 0.0485
move waste min collective return 6.8 −14.1 −8.5 −7.8 −19.8
Harvest add wall min collective return −1.5 −99.1 −12.1 −26.0 −26.3
max collective return −1.5 71.2 6.5 13.4 0.0
min Gini index 0.0152 −0.0219 0.0156 0.0028 0.0185
max Gini index 0.0152 0.0993 0.0240 0.0433 0.0262
remove wall max collective return 12.9 37.8 31.2 44.4 42.3
min Gini index −0.0007 −0.0093 −0.0138 −0.0054 −0.0032
max Gini index −0.0007 0.0092 −0.0025 0.0041 −0.0036
Table 4.Mean performance of the OBOE central agents on each task, with the random
baseline and CV benchmark. The RFM OBOE agent always outperformed the random
baseline – the other OBOE agents were worse than random on 2 tasks each.
where M¯CA is the sample mean of the metric M achieved by a central agent
CA for a specific task. Figure 4 shows the mean cross-task effectiveness of each
model; Table 4 shows a full breakdown of the mean effects.
Fig. 4. Average percent effectiveness rela-
tive to CV, across significant tasks. The er-
ror bars indicate standard error.
Note that this is a very limited set
of games and settings, so we can’t gen-
eralise any conclusions from compar-
ing the model architectures. Instead
the main comparison of interest is be-
tween CV (which uses simulations to
make an unbiased estimate of each
intervention’s effect) and the OBOE
central agents (which use a learned
model to extrapolate from observa-
tional data); the striking result is that
the OBOE agents are able to do 56%
as well on average as the CV central
agent, even though the former are be-
ing applied outside their training distributions, and the latter has access to
targeted ground-truth simulations.
8 Discussion and future work
We introduced OBOE, a novel, widely applicable method for constructing a
central agent that selects modifications to a physical environment with multiple
interacting agents, to maximize social metrics. In environments where it’s pro-
hibitively expensive to test out modifications, or run high-quality simulations
of them, OBOE learns from observational data (i.e., recordings of the environ-
ment in which no intervention has been made), and constructs a state-action
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Q-function that predicts the effects of physical interventions on the social metric
of interest.
We validated OBOE on a range of tasks consisting of different social metrics
and games, using different candidate interventions and predictive architectures.
Averaging across all of these, OBOE was 56% as effective as an estimated ideal
central agent that was able to perfectly test each modification multiple times.
Notably, our constructed Q-function is a causal effect estimate based on
correlations in the training set. It’s worth discussing why this can work. The main
principle is: if the environment (including players) is Markov then causal effects
on future outcomes are equal to conditional expectations of those outcomes
on the intervention timestep, and if the interventions are within the training
distribution then a well-trained model will have low prediction error on them.
In our experiments we relied on two environments, using four families of
candidate interventions which were effective in shifting the metrics. The envi-
ronments were approximately Markov (with the only non-stationarity being the
players’ recurrent neural network states). However, the interventions were out-
side the training distribution to varying degrees (e.g. there are no free-floating
walls in the training distribution), so the models needed to extrapolate using
their inductive biases.
It is worth briefly discussing how actions picked using our model can some-
times lead to a better outcome than actions selected using cross-validation (i.e.
constructed using the true simulator as a model). In the high-variance settings
we consider, where the inherent stochasticity of individual agents’ policies has
large effects on social outcomes, a model trained on large and diverse datasets
might be better than unbiased simulators that only consider a few realizations.
While we presented OBOE as a replacement for a simulator, it could also
be used in conjunction with a simulator that’s accurate but expensive to run
or design; OBOE could identify promising interventions quickly using a neural
network forward pass, permitting better use of the simulation budget. The ad-
vantage would be increased if the environment had substantial stochasticity or
if there was a larger action space to search through, requiring more simulations.
In the broader context of multi-agent research and simulation, OBOE con-
stitutes an important tool to evaluate the effects planned modifications to the
environment might have on complex social metrics.
Appendix A Model details
Here we describe hyperparameters and training for the models in Section 3.
The RFM is constituted of an “edge block” ReLU MLP that computes a represen-
tation for each edge given the global and adjacent node features, feeding into a “node
block” ReLU MLP that computes a representation for each node given the existing
node features, global features, and incoming edge features. In the case of Cleanup, we
used batch size 640; edge MLP layer sizes 64, 32, 32; and node MLP layer sizes 64, 32,
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32, 1. In the case of Harvest, we used batch size 160; edge MLP layer sizes 5 × 128;
and node MLP layer sizes 5× 128, 1.7
For the MLP models, we again used batch size 640 for Cleanup and 160 for Harvest.
The layer sizes for Cleanup were 64, 32, 32, 5, while for Harvest they were 128, 128,
128, 128, 5. (The final 5 corresponds to the 5 players.)
For the CNN models, we used batch size 160 and kernel sizes 3×3. For Cleanup, we
used 8 layers, with channel counts 2×64, 3×128, 3×256, with strides 1, 1, 2×(2, 1, 1).
For Harvest, we used 5 layers, with channel counts 2 × 64, 3 × 128, with strides 1, 1,
2, 1, 1. Each layer was followed by a batch normalizer and a ReLU activation, and the
final layer was followed by an average pooling layer and a linear layer.
For learning the model parameters we used an RMSProp [37] optimizer with learn-
ing rate 10−4, for 2.5 · 106 steps, or until convergence. Approximately 2 · 105 episodes
of data were in the training set for each game; the validation set for each was 1000
episodes. The optimization criterion in every case was the mean squared error relative
to the true forward returns of the players in the given episodes.
Appendix B Tasks
B.1 Cleanup: game and agents
Cleanup is a played on an 18× 25 map, in which 5 players collect apples (each worth
+1 reward) from a field. The field is sustained by a connected aquifer on which waste
appears at a constant rate. The apple spawn rate falls linearly with the amount of waste
in the aquifer, up to a saturation point where apples do not spawn. At the start of each
game episode, no apples are present, and the waste level is just beyond saturation.
Each game episode runs for 1000 time steps. At each timestep, players observe
a 15 × 15 RGB window centered at their position and orientation. Agents can move
around or fire a “fining beam” or “cleanup beam”, both of which have limited range.
The fining beam gives −50 reward to a player that’s within range if there is one, and
−1 reward to the player using it. The cleanup beam removes waste within its range.
Standard RL algorithms for this task don’t find a policy that responds effectively
to the dilemma between collecting apples and tending to the public good[20]. Since
this particular issue is outside the scope of this work, we side-stepped it by letting
some agents be intrinsically motivated to clean the aquifer. Specifically, we trained
2 policies with additional reward per unit of waste cleaned: a “prosocial” policy that
would receive +1, and an “antisocial” policy that would receive −1. These were co-
trained using episodes in which players were randomly assigned them in a 1:4, 2:3, 3:2,
or 4:1 proportion, using A2C [14]. After convergence, these populations behave in a
sensible way in the environment and, as a group, collect close to the optimal number
of apples in each episode.
B.2 Harvest: game, procedural generation, and agents
Harvest is a common pool resource game on a 35 × 23 map. In Harvest, the apple
spawn rate in each field location depends on the number of nearby apples, and falls to
zero once there are no apples within a certain radius. Each player’s observations and
7 The final 1 indicates that there is only one scalar prediction for each node; predictions
for non-player nodes are ignored.
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actions are as in Cleanup, except there is no cleanup beam, the fining beam gives a
reward of −30 to the target agent, and agents are not visually distinguishable (i.e. all
agents appear red to other agents, and blue to themselves).
The maps were procedurally generated to have corner rooms of varying size enclosed
by walls, sometimes perforated or absent. The exact procedure is as follows. Each corner
of the map has a room, randomly assigned height 6 or 9 and width 12 or 15. For each
room, we generate walls; 20% of the time, the wall will be “perforated” by letting each
wall location remain as a hole with 10% probability. Next we add an entrance corridor to
each room, as in Figure 3; the location of the entrance must be a wall location that isn’t
in a corner or adjacent to a hole. (If no such locations exist, we don’t add an entrance.)
We then generate apple locations: we randomly choose 6% of eligible locations (rounded
down), and add apples at those locations plus their immediate neighbours. All in-room
locations are eligible apart from walls, holes, and entrance corridors. Finally, with 30%
probability we randomly sample 1 or 2 (depending on whether height is 6 or 9) eligible
locations as player spawn locations, and remove all of the walls. After this has been
done for each room, we adjust the number of player spawn locations to 5, by either
subsampling, or sampling from the non-room map locations.
In all other respects, the Cleanup and Harvest games are as published at [39].
In Harvest, we considered two types of intervention: adding walls, and removing
walls, at time 30. As discussed in Section 4, these were procedurally generated to
ensure they are valid. This was done by starting from a random suitable map location
(wall for removing, non-wall non-player for adding), randomly choosing whether to
extend horizontally or vertically, and then randomly choosing how far to extend in that
direction. For removing, the length to extend in each direction was chosen uniformly
between 0 and the maximum reachable amount of wall. For adding, the maximum
length was broken into 3 partitions using a Dirichlet-multinomial distribution with
parameters ( 1
2
, 2, 1
2
), and the middle one was used as the wall segment.
As with Cleanup, standard RL algorithms can’t find a sustainable policy for Harvest
[20] so we modified the environment slightly: in our agent training, if a player moves
to collect an apple with k < 3 apples within distance 2, collection would fail with
probability 2−k.
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